Abstract This paper studies the policy iteration algorithm (PIA) for zero-sum stochastic differential games with the basic long-run average criterion, as well as with its more selective version, the so-called bias criterion. The system is assumed to be a nondegenerate diffusion. We use Lyapunov-like stability conditions that ensure the existence and boundedness of the solution to certain Poisson equation. We also ensure the convergence of a sequence of such solutions, of the corresponding sequence of policies, and, ultimately, of the PIA.
Introduction
This paper is about two-person zero-sum stochastic differential games (SDGs) with ergodic payoffs on an infinite horizon. This sort of games has been studied, for instance in [10, 12, 26] . Our aim is to give conditions under which the policy iteration algorithm (PIA) produces convergent sequences of values and policies for an SDG with ergodic payoffs.
The motivation for our developments lies in the fact that the PIA can be an alternative theoretical tool to the classic Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan fixed point theorem for proving the existence of Nash equilibria in the context of nonzero-sum SDGs. Indeed, while studying the problem of the existence of saddle points in the class of nonzero-sum games, it turns out that Theorem 1 in [13] does not necessarily hold for infinite-dimensional spaces, hence it becomes necessary to impose additional conditions on the system (for instance, a separability property-cf. [11] ) to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This work intends to avoid imposing such conditions, and to provide insights on the PIA for zero-sum SDGs under two long-run average criteria. Our results and developments can be thought of as an introduction of a useful technique for the more general problem of a nonzero-sum game.
The PIA was first introduced by Howard [21] . It was used later by Fleming [14] to study some finite horizon control problems in 1963. Bismut [8] and Puterman [35, 36] studied its convergence rate. In two-person zero-sum games, Van der Wal [41] presented a convergent version of the algorithm that works under the assumption that both, the state space and the action space are finite. More recently, Zhu et al. developed convergent versions of the PIA for the basic average payoff criterion for Markov decision processes in [43, 45] . The goal of the PIA is to generate sequences of policies and value functions for a control problem that converge to the optimal control and value function, respectively.
Our work can be thought of as a bridge between the theory presented in the references quoted above, and the problem of finding an equilibrium for an SDG under ergodic criteria without necessarily (i) departing from a discounted payoff problem and (ii) using the well-known vanishing discount technique. Moreover, we provide sufficient conditions for the convergence of the algorithm when both players choose their respective actions independently from each other. These steps are customary, at least for ergodic control problems (see, for example, [4, Chap. II, 9, Corollary 6.2, 30]).
Our set of assumptions ensure (i) the existence of the value of certain zero-sum SDG with average payoff and (ii) the convergence of the PIA to a saddle point of such game. To these ends, we will use some results from the theory of second order partial differential equations [17] and, for a given pair of strategies, we will use the concept of its bias from the game's value [32, 33] (see also [42, 44] for more insights on bias problems). We will present a standard version of the PIA and a slight modification that is proven to work in the bias game as well.
The algorithm we present resembles the one introduced in [19] and [43, 45] for controlled Markov decision processes in Borel spaces, and is inspired in the Hoffman-Karp's (HK) version presented in [41] . In the latter algorithm, the first step is to fix the action of one of the players to find the other player's best action, thus reducing the game in that stage to a Markov decision process. Then one finds the current value of the game and then moves on to the next iteration, where the other player's best action is fixed. There are two main differences between the HK algorithm presented in [41] , and our work:
• In [41] , it is supposed that both the action and the set spaces are finite; we consider them to be uncountable.
• The payoff criterion used in [41] is that of the discounted reward. We consider two more specialized criteria: long-run average and bias optimality.
It should be noted that the point of departure of our presentation is the existence of a differentiable solution of the so-called Poisson equation. We have given sufficient conditions and a proof of this fact in our previous works (see [24, Theorem 5.4] , and [27, Theorem 3.4] ). The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic hypotheses on the system, the type of strategies we will use, the reward rate, and the basic average payoff citerion for zero-sum SDGs. Section 3 introduces the algorithm we are interested in and quotes a result on the existence of the solution to the dynamic programming approach to the ergodic criterion problem. In Sect. 4 we present: (i) the policy convergence form we are interested in, and (ii) our main results: Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.3. The bias game and an extension of the PIA to this context is in Sect. 5. We present an example of the PIA for the average criterion and for the bias game in Sect. 6. Finally, we give some concluding remarks in Sect. 7.
Throughout the following, for vectors x and matrices A, we use the norms
and jAj
where A 0 and TrðÁÞ denote the transpose of A ¼ A ij À Á and the trace of a square matrix, respectively. Moreover, if h : R N ! R is a smooth function, then rh and Hh represent the gradient vector of h (i.e., the vector of partial derivatives of h with respect to x i for i ¼ 1; Á Á Á ; N) and the Hessian matrix of h, i.e., Hh ¼ o
respectively.
Preliminaries
This section introduces the SDG we are concerned with, as well as some important underlying concepts.
Dynamics of the System
Let U 1 and U 2 be compact subsets of some complete and separable vector normed spaces. We consider the N-dimensional process xðÁÞ defined, for all t > 0 by dxðtÞ ¼ b xðtÞ; u 1 ðtÞ; u 2 ðtÞ ð Þ dt þ r xðtÞ ð ÞdWðtÞ ð 2:1Þ with initial condition xð0Þ ¼ x, where b : 
Moreover, the uniform ellipticity condition (2.2) enables us to deal with the average optimality equations (2.31)-(2.33) below with the aid of the results in [17] .
consists of all real-valued continuous functions on R N with continuous l-th partial derivative in x i 2 R, for i ¼ 1; Á Á Á ; N, l ¼ 0; 1; Á Á Á ; j. where aðÁÞ is as in Assumption 2.1(b).
Strategies
Let U ' be the set of admissible actions for player ' ¼ 1; 2, and assume that U ' is compact. Denote by V ' the space of probability measures on U ' endowed with the topology of weak convergence. This notion allows us to think of V ' as a compact metric space. (See [5, Chap. 7.4] 
We also use
Remark 2.4 A direct calculation yields that bðÁ; u; wÞ defined in (2. 
wðxÞ:
1 ð1 þ d=cÞ and d ¼ Àðlog q 1 Þ=T, so that the result follows. h The following result is true by virtue of Dynkin's formula and (2.12).
Lemma 2.10 Assume that (2.12) holds. Let
Then mðÁÞ is a constant; in fact, 
Average Optimality
Let R be a positive real number and " B R be the closure of
Let us now introduce the payoff or reward/cost rate function r from
to R. Let us impose some conditions on r. Recall that U 1 and U 2 are compact subsets of given complete and separable vector normed spaces.
Assumption 2.11
The function r is (a) continuous on R N Â U 1 Â U 2 and locally Lipschitz in x uniformly in
MwðxÞ for all x 2 R N ; (c) concave in U 1 , and convex in U 2 .
Analogously to (2.4) and (2.5), when using randomized Markov policies
Similarly, for u; w for all x; y 2 " B R .
The following result provides important facts.
Lemma 2.13 Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.11(a), the function rðx; Á; ÁÞ is continuous on
Proof Under the given Assumptions, the functions b and r are continuous in The goal of player 1 is to maximize his rewards, whereas that of player 2 is to minimize his costs in a given time horizon with respect to some performance criterion. We shall deal with ergodic payoffs, and we study first the so-called long run average payoff of (2. 
In fact, by (2.18), 
Hence, multiplying the latter equality by 1 T and letting T ! 1, by (2.12), we obtain, 
The function L is called the game's lower value, and U is the game's upper value. Clearly, we have L 6 U. If these two numbers coincide, then the game is said to have a value, say V. This number is the common value of L and U, i.e.,
As a consequence of (2.26) and (2.25), L and U are finite. This implies that V is also finite if the second equality in (2.29) holds. The basic problem we are concerned with is to find average payoff equilibria or saddle points of the average payoff SDG. Namely, we are interested in pairs p Observe that
Step Increase m in 1 and go back to step 2.
Remark 3.1 Observe that Remark 2.14 makes us indifferent between using the PIA version we have proposed, and using a modification that minimizes in (3.2) in step 2, and maximizes in (3.4) in step 4. 
To ensure the convergence of the PIA, we need to guarantee it is well-defined. To do this, it is necessary to satisfy the following conditions.
( 
Proof A slight variation of the vanishing discount technique (see, for instance the Appendix of [12] , or [27, Chaps. 5, 6]) gives us that, for fixed p
the Poisson equation (3.5) has a solutionh p 1 ;p 2 , which is a member of side of (3.11) converges to l p 1 ;p 2h p 1 ;p 2 À Á as t goes to infinity; but, by (3.9), this last limit becomes zero. Therefore, letting t ! 1 in both sides of (3.11), we obtaiñ
which coincides with the bias h p 1 ;p 2 defined in (3.6). These facts also yield uniqueness of solutions to equation (3.5) , and Proposition 3.4 follows. h From (2.31)-(2.33) and Proposition 2.18, it is easy to see that the constant J in (2.31) is the value of the average payoff game. Moreover, the same arguments lead to the conclusion that a pair of canonical strategies is always average optimal. The following result ensures that the converse is also true. We offer a complete proof based on the vanishing discount technique for control problems (cf. [4, 30] 
is a saddle point of the SDG with average payoff.
Proof The relations (4.1)-(4.3) imply
An application of Proposition 2.18 yields (a). Part (b) of the result is immediate from (a) and (2.30) . h 
Proposition 4.2 Let p
be the sequence generated by the PIA. If Assumptions 2.1, 2.5 and 2.11 hold, then, there exists p 
We shall use Lemma 4.1 to conclude the proof. Namely, observe that (3.1) in step 2 of the PIA ensures that (4.1) holds. In addition, (3.4) in step 4 yields (4.3). Hence, Lemma 4.1b asserts that p
is a saddle point of the ergodic game and the result is thus proved. h
Bias Optimality
Throughout the following we will suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.5, 2.8 and 2.11 hold.
We recall that the set of strategies that satisfy (2.30) is denoted by
Recall as well Definition 3.3 of the bias h p 1 ;p 2 and its characterization as solution of the Poisson equation given in Proposition 3.4.
The following definition uses the concept of average payoff equilibira introduced above.
Definition 5.1 We say that an average payoff equilibrium p 
be the family of bias equilibria. By Definition 5.1,
Á be a solution of the average optimality equations (2.31)-(2.33). We define for every x 2 R N the sets 
As an abuse of terminology, we take the supremum and the infimum of equations (5.8) and (5.9), respectively, over the sets P 1 ðxÞ and P 2 ðxÞ, when, actually we should take them over the sets of probability measures defined on P 1 ðxÞ and P 2 ðxÞ. However, note that this is not necessary because, by Lemma 5.3 these sets are readily convex and compact.
The set-valued mapping x 7 ! P 1 ðxÞ (resp. where V Ã h is the value of the bias game.
Bias Optimality Equations
We give a characterization of bias equilibria by means of the bias optimality equations defined as follows. Part (ii) follows from Theorem 3.5(ii) applied to the bias game. h
The PIA for the Bias Game
By the proof of Theorem 5.5, the bias game can be expressed as an SDG with a particular average payoff. We will use this and a modification of the PIA presented in Sect. 3 to find another characterization of bias equilibria. We assume that the original SDG with average payoff of Sect. 2.4 has been solved, i.e., J is the game value, p Step 1 Set m ¼ 0. Fix p 2 0 2 P 2 ðxÞ and defineJ 0 :¼ À1.
Step 2 Find a policy p Step 4 Determine an average optimal strategy p 2 mþ1 ðÁjxÞ 2 P 2 ðxÞ that attains the minimum on (5.9).
Increase m in 1 and go to step 2. Analogously to the end of Sect. 3, there are some critical parts we must verify to ensure that this version of the PIA for the bias game is well-defined and yields a pair of bias equilibria. These remarks, together with Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.3 give that the PIA for the bias game is well-defined.
An Example
Now we will give an example to illustrate our results. This is an extension of the example presented in [12] which in turn was motivated by the manufacturing system in [1] .
Step 4 We use (6.8) to determine the minimum referred to in (5.9). That is is a Nash equilibrium for the bias game, and thatJ 2 is the optimal value of the game.
Concluding Remarks
This work is intended to give sufficient conditions under which the PIA converges in a certain class of games. This represents a breakthrough with respect to the current literature because, nor the space state, neither the action sets are finite, or even denumerable. The main contributions of our work are the PIA versions for SDGs presented in Sects. 3 and 5, Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.3. Our versions of the PIA are suitable extensions to the continuous-time scheme of that presented in [19, 45] and of algorithm (HK) in [41] . As for Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.3, we acknowledge that they are inspired in [19 [45] ), respectively. This work represents as well a continuation of our study of bias games (presented in [12] ), in the sense that it provides a way of finding bias equilibria in terms of an ergodic game.
One of the main tools we used to assert the convergence of randomized stationary policies for each of the players was Theorem 4.3. Through this result we saw that the sequence of saddle points generated by the PIA, converges, in the sense of Schäl, to an equilibrium of the SDG with ergodic payoff.
We have made a rather implicit, but extensive use of the uniform ellipticity condition (2.2) on the diffusion (2.1). This particular hypothesis, along with the other assumptions in our work allowed us to assert the existence of each of the members of the sequence fh m g referred to in step 2 of the PIA. This condition also enables our use of Theorem 3.4 in [27] to ensure the existence of a function h in C 2 R N À Á \ B w ðR N Þ such that h m ! h as m ! 1. The last key to our results is the w-exponential ergodicity referred to in (2.12) . This relation gives the existence and finiteness of the bias function h p 1 ;p 2 in (3.5). Therefore (2.12) represents the sine qua non condition to extend the controlled version of the PIA presented in [19] to the SDGs' context.
